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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II.
THE REMEDY FOR A MISDEMEANOR DEFENDANT DEPRIVED
OF COUNSEL IS VACATION OF ANY JAIL TIME, LEAVING THE
BALANCE OF HIS SENTENCE IN PLACE AND HIS CONVICTION
AVAILABLE TO ENHANCE FUTURE OFFENSES
A.

The relief granted by the Court in Shelton is incompatible with
defendant's theory that Shelton's conviction is invalid.

In Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. at 674. The Alabama court had "affirm[ed]
Shelton's conviction but reverse[d] that aspect of his sentence imposing 30 days of
suspended jail time." Ex parte Lereed Shelton, 851 So.2d 96, 102 (2000). Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed Shelton's conviction and sentence except the suspended jail time.
Seeking to distinguish Shelton, defendant contends that the Supreme Court's
affirmance of Shelton's conviction lacks precedential significance because "Alabama only

sought review of the Alabama Supreme Court's invalidation of the defendant's suspended
sentence but did not challenge the state court's affirmation of defendant's conviction." Br.
Aple. at 25. Defendant further asserts that "the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shelton and
prior case law show that a misdemeanor conviction taken in violation of the Sixth
Amendment is invalid." Br. Aple. at 26.
The relief granted in Shelton demonstrates that the Supreme Court did not affirm
Shelton's conviction merely because it had not been challenged. By affirming the Alabama
court, the Supreme Court affirmed not only Shelton's conviction, but an assessment of court
costs, a fine of $500, reparations of $25, and a restitution award of $516.69. Id. at 658
(specifying the components of the sentence), 674 (affirming Alabama court); Ex Parte
Shelton, 851 So.2d at 102 (affirming all components of the sentence except suspended jail
time). In fact, the Court did not even vacate his term of probation, expressly leaving to the
Alabama court the question of whether, despite the invalidation of Shelton's suspended
sentence, his probation term could be "freestanding and independently effective." Shelton,
535 U.S. at 674. Obviously, the Supreme Court could not have ordered this relief had
Shelton's conviction been invalidated.
Shelton was deprived of his right to counsel, yet his conviction remained valid to
support all aspects of his sentence except the suspended jail term. Such a conviction is thus
necessarily "also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction."
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 749 (1994).

2

B.

Defendant's prior conviction is just as reliable as it would have
been had no jail time been imposed.

Defendant complains that "his prior conviction cannot be 'credited as reliable' absent
a showing that he waived his right to 'the guiding hand of counsel.'" Br. Aple. at 27 (quoting
Shelton, 535 U.S. at 665, in turn quoting Argersinger v. Hamilton, 407 U.S. 25,40 (1972)).
On the contrary, any implication that the guiding hand of counsel is the sine qua non of
reliability for purposes of subsequent enhancements is simply incorrect. An uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction is sufficiently reliable to support a sentence that includes no jail
time. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). It is also
sufficiently reliable to enhance a subsequent conviction, even if the enhancement increases
prison time. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748.
The fact that jail time was temporarily attached to such a conviction changes nothing.
Shelton's conviction was neither more nor less reliable because the appellate court, rather
than the trial court, determined that no suspended j ail time could be imposed. Once Shelton' s
jail time was vacated, his remaining sentence and his underlying conviction were perfectly
legal and reliable for all purposes, including enhancement of a subsequent offense.
So here, had defendant received no jail time for his prior offense, his conviction
would indisputably have been available to enhance the instant offense. The imposition of
suspended jail time did not make that conviction any less reliable, or any less suitable for
enhancement purposes, than if the suspended jail time had never been imposed.
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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT L
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION IS ENTITLED TO THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY, WHICH DEFENDANT DID
NOT REBUT
If this Court agrees with the State on the first issue, it need not reach the second. This
is so because even if defendant's jail sentence was wrongly imposed, and thus subject to
vacation, his underlying conviction, like Shelton's, remains valid for enhancement purposes.
However, if this Court concludes that a prior uncounseled conviction involving jail
time may not be used to enhance a subsequent charge unless the defendant duly waived his
right to counsel, it must address two further questions. First, does defendant bear the burden
of proving whether defendant waived his right to counsel? Second, if so, did he satisfy it?
A.

Defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of
regularity even if the prior judgment shows he appeared pro se.

Defendant claims that the presumption of regularity "does not attach when a
conviction shows on its face that a defendant was not represented by counsel." Br. Aple. at
8 (capitalization and italics omitted). Here, he argues, "the presumption of regularity never
attached" to his prior conviction because "there is no indication from the record of conviction
that he was advised or waived his right to counsel." Br. Aple. at 13. Therefore, he
concludes, "the State had the burden of proving that Mr. Ferguson knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel." Br. Aple. at 9.
The "presumption of regularity" is "deeply rooted in our jurisprudence." Parke v.
Raley, 506 U.S. 20,29 (1992). Even a prior conviction that demonstrates on its face that the
4

defendant was unrepresented is entitled to this presumption. This is so because a defendant
may waive his right to counsel. A contrary approach would, rather than respecting the
presumption that courts "know and follow the law," presume that the trial court violated the
law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2003) (rejecting federal habeas challenge to
state conviction).
Controlling case law does not distinguish between prior convictions in which the
defendant was unrepresented and those in which the defendant waived counsel. State v.
Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 (1989), holds that a judgment of conviction "is entitled to a
presumption of regularity, including a presumption that the defendant was represented by
counsel. This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State may have of proving that the
defendant had or knowingly wqived counsel." Id. at 149 (emphasis added). Defendant
asserts the opposite: that despite the presumption of regularity, "the State had the burden of
proving that Mr. Ferguson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel." Br. Aple.
at 9.
The presumption of regularity is not reversed by a notation on defendant's conviction
that he appeared pro se. Defendant argues that, "Read together, Burgett[l] and Triptow[2]
stand for the proposition that a presumption of regularity only attaches when there is nothing
on the face of the conviction to indicate that a defendant was not represented by counsel."

1

Burgettv. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).

2

State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1989).
5

Br. Aple. at 11. On the contrary, Triptow makes clear that the court must presume, not that
defendant was represented in the prior proceeding, but that "the right to counsel has been
observed." 770 P.2d at 149. "This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State may
have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived counsel." Id. Triptow thus
explicitly relieves the State of any initial burden of proving that the defendant knowingly
waived counsel.
State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, 68 P.3d 1035, underscores this conclusion.
Defendant suggests that Gutierrez reiterates that the presumption of voluntariness applies
only to counseled guilty pleas: "This Court reiterated that it is 'a plea entered with the benefit
of counsel [that] is "presumed to have been voluntary"' . . . ." See Br. Aple. at 11, n.4.
Gutierrez does state that "a plea entered with the benefit of counsel is 'presumed to have
been voluntary5 absent evidence demonstrating lack of voluntariness." 2003 UT App 95, ^f
8 (citation omitted). But Gutierrez involved two prior guilty pleas, one entered in 1994 and
one in 1999. Id. at ^f 5. It is apparent from the opinion that Gutierrez was represented in the
1994 plea, but not in the 1999 plea. See Id. atffl[6-9. Yet this Court applied the presumption
of regularity to both. Id. at ^f 13.
B.

Defendant did not rebut the presumption of regularity.

Defendant claims that "even if the Court determines that the burden shifted to Mr.
Ferguson, he produced 'some evidence5 that he was unrepresented and did not knowingly
waive counsel." Br. Aple. at 14. On the contrary, defendant produced no evidence.
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When the State relies on a prior conviction to enhance a present offense, "the State
bears the burden of proving the prior conviction..." Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149. "A previous
judgment of conviction so proven is entitled to a presumption of regularity, including a
presumption that the defendant was represented by counsel. This presumption satisfies any
initial burden the State may have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived
counsel." Id The burden then shifts to defendant: "After proof of the previous conviction
is introduced, the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence
that he or she was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel." Id.
This showing shifts the burden back to the State: "Once the defendant has presented some
evidence, the presumption of regularity is rebutted and the burden shifts to the State to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in fact represented or knowingly
waived representation." Id.
Gutierrez holds that a defendant's self-serving affidavit does not rise to the level of
"some evidence." Gutierrez challenged a prior conviction based on a proceeding in which
he apparently was unrepresented. He submitted an affidavit asserting that "the judge did not
inform him of his right to counsel" and "that he was not offered the assistance of a public
defender." 2003 UT App 95, \ 9. This Court held that, for reasons of precedent and policy,
a defendant's self-serving affidavit is, by itself, "insufficient to invalidate a prior conviction."
Id. at \ 10 (citations omitted). In addition, this Court stated that "a defendant seeking to rebut
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the presumption of regularity must produce a transcript, testimony regarding taking of the
plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative evidence." Id. at ^ 11 (citations omitted).
Here, defendant relies on the fact that the certified copy of the Judgment, Sentence
and Commitment showed that defendant appeared pro se and "did not contain any notations
or make reference to whether Mr. Ferguson was advised of or waived his right to counsel."
Br. Aple. at 16. What defendant describes is not some evidence, but no evidence. Where the
record does not indicate one way or the other whether defendant duly waived his right to
counsel, the presumption of regularity prevails. To rule otherwise would be to presume that
the court violated the law.
Parke v. Raley supports recognizing the presumption of regularity. There, although
the judgment did not indicate that Raley either had or waived counsel, the Supreme CourT
found "no good reason to suspend the presumption of regularity," since that was not a case
where "an extant transcript is suspiciously 'silent' on the question whether the defendant
waived constitutional rights": "[e]vidently, no transcripts or other records of the earlier plea
colloquies exist at all." Parke, 506 U.S. at 30. In other words, although a silent transcript
is suspicious, a silent judgment—as here—is not.
This rule supplanted the rule of Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). In Burgett,
the Court, seeing "no indication in the record" that the pro se Burgett had duly waived
counsel, held that "[presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible." Id.
at 112, 114-15. The Parke Court distinguished Burgett on the ground that at the time of
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Burgett's plea, "state criminal defendants' federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet
been recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the defendant had not waived a
right he did not possess." Parke, 506 U.S. at 31. In contrast, at the time of Raley's plea, the
Boykin requirements were well established, so it was reasonable to presume that Raley had
waived those rights. Id.
Parke controls the case at bar. When defendant first pled guilty, his right to counsel
had been established by Shelton the previous year. Absent countervailing evidence, the plea
court must be presumed to have obeyed Shelton, Defendant counters that, although
Shelton had been decided the previous year, the prosecutor and trial judge in the instant case
were apparently unaware of it. See Br. Aple. at 20-21. Yet the relevant inquiry is not
whether the judge in the instant case was aware of Shelton, but whether the judge in the prior
case was. Defendant offers no evidence that he was not. Nor does the record establish that
courts generally were disregarding Shelton nearly a year after its issuance.
Defendant cautions that reading Parke as the State does "would in effect create an
irrebuttable presumption." Br. Aple. at 22. The Parke Court recognized that "serious
practical difficulties will confront any party assigned an evidentiary burden in such
circumstances." 506 U.S. at 31-32. Nevertheless, it assigned that burden to the party
attacking a final conviction, observing that the government has no greater access to relevant
evidence than the defendant. Id. at 32. If extrinsic evidence of waiver of counsel is generally
unavailable or difficult to produce, placing the presumption may well decide the contest.
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Thus, the practical and unacceptable effect of placing the burden upon the government, as
defendant urges, would be to uproot the presumption of regularity and replace it with a
presumption of irregularity.
Finally, defendant contends that In re Smith, 925 P.2d 169 (Utah 1996), supports his
claim that "a copy of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment explicitly stating Mr.
Ferguson appeared pro se and the lack of any notation that he was advised of his right or
waived it is enough to rebut the presumption of regularity on a prior conviction." Br. Aple.
at 23. On the contrary, Smith demonstrates how far short of such a showing defendant falls.
Numerous references to the record in the Smith opinion suggest that Smith had placed before
the Supreme Court a complete record of the criminal trial at which he represented himself,
including transcripts of motion hearings, scheduling conferences, and trial. See id. at 172-73.
"[A] defendant seeking to rebut the presumption of regularity must produce a
transcript, testimony regarding taking of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative
evidence." Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^| 11. As noted above, Smith apparently produced
a transcript. (Although the Smith court nevertheless concluded that "the prosecution met its
burden of showing that Smith knowingly waived his right to counsel." Smith, 925 P.2d at
173.) Defendant here has produced nothing—not even a "self-serving affidavit" of the type
found wanting in Gutierrez. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^ 12. Instead, he relies on a
judgment silent on the decisive question of whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and
voluntary. The presumption of regularity consequently remains unrebutted.

10

CONCLUSION
The order of the trial court striking the enhancement to the charge of violation of a
protective order should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on | ^ ? October 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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sistant Attorney General
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